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699 
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND 
PRE-TRIAL DETAINEES 
Nicole Johnson* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that juvenile offenders 
should not be held to the same standards of accountability or degrees 
of punishment as adults.1  Despite recent changes in federal and state 
laws prohibiting the use of solitary confinement for juvenile 
offenders,2 it continues to be used as a routine form of punishment for 
juveniles in most states.  Although its use has been banned in New 
York State prisons, county facilities within the state are not held to the 
same regulations, and therefore continue to implement this harsh 
punishment regardless of its detrimental impact on juveniles.3  Riker’s 
Island Correctional Facility (“Riker’s”) stopped using solitary 
confinement for juvenile offenders after the 2015 suicide of Kalief 
Browder.4  Kalief was arrested at the age of sixteen, accused of stealing 
a backpack from a delivery man.5  He appeared in Bronx criminal court 
for the first time in May of 2010.6  The judge placed a three thousand 
dollar bail on Kalief, despite his lack of a violent criminal background.7  
 
* J.D. Candidate 2020, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, B.A. Forensic 
Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice.  I want to thank Professor Seplowitz for her 
advice and guidance in writing this note.  I would also like to thank Steven Fink and Michael 
Morales for all of their help during the editing process. 
1 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
2 Kevin Liptak, Obama Bans Solitary Confinement for Juveniles in Federal Prison, CNN 
POLITICS (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/25/politics/obama-bans-juvenile-
solitary-confinement/index.html. 
3 Gary Gately, Juvenile Solitary Confinement: Modern Day ‘Torture’ in the US, 
CORRECTIONS.COM (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.corrections.com/news/article/35445-
juvenile-solitary-confinement-modern-day-torture-in-the-us. 
4 TIME: THE KALIEF BROWDER STORY (Weinstein Television 2017) [hereinafter THE KALIEF 
BROWDER STORY].   
5 Id.   
6 Id.   
7 Id. 
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He was then transferred to Riker’s, where he was incarcerated for 
nearly three years.8  Kalief Browder spent more than seven-hundred 
days of his incarceration in solitary confinement.9  
Kalief was unjustly punished and placed in solitary 
confinement on multiple occasions, without being provided a 
misconduct hearing.10  While in solitary, he was confined to a small 
cell for twenty-three hours per day, with only a metal bed, a sink and 
a toilet.11  Inmates in solitary are not entitled to commissary, and 
therefore, are only able to eat when the guards slide a tray of food 
through a slit in the cell door.12  However, Kalief was often given half 
eaten trays of food or not fed at all.13  Kalief described feeling isolated, 
depressed and hopeless.14  He pleaded for help from the jail 
psychiatrist, but his pleas fell on deaf ears.15  He talked to himself and 
expressed to the psychiatrist that he felt like he was going insane.16  
During his time in Riker’s, Kalief attempted suicide three times.17  
Despite his suicide attempts, he was immediately brought back to 
solitary confinement instead of receiving psychiatric treatment or 
placed into general population.18  The correctional officers claimed that 
they believed Kalief was exaggerating his symptoms and faking his 
suicide attempts.19  Because there was no mandatory procedure in 
effect, the guards had absolute discretion over Kalief’s access to 
medical and psychiatric treatment.20  Furthermore, one of his most 
important lifelines at the time, his legal aid attorney, made no attempt 
to have Kalief released from solitary or receive medical treatment.21  
Because of his refusal to join a gang, inmates and guards repeatedly 
assaulted Kalief.22  Many of the assaults were captured on video at 
Riker’s and showed guards clearly assaulting Kalief without cause and 
 
8 Id. 
9 Id.   
10 Id.   
11 Id.   
12 Id.  
13 Id.   
14 Id.   
15 Id. 
16 Id.   
17 Id. 
18 Id.   
19 Id.   
20 Id.   
21 Id.  
22 Id. 
2
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allowing inmates to assault Kalief in their presence without attempting 
to intervene.23  
During the three years Kalief was incarcerated, he was 
transported to court over thirty times just to face the disappointment of 
prosecutorial delays and constant adjournments.24  Despite the right to 
a speedy trial, New York’s “ready rule” is blatantly abused by 
prosecutors to delay trial and force plea bargains on desperate inmates 
with no means to bail out.25  Kalief was offered a plea on several 
occasions but refused every time.26  He was told at one of his court 
appearances that if he accepted the plea bargain, he could go home that 
same day.27  Unlike most inmates, who take plea bargains to avoid the 
delays and risks of trial, Kalief believed the system could still work for 
him.28  He refused to take any deal and adamantly insisted on his 
innocence.29  At his final court appearance, the prosecutors were forced 
to reveal that the complaining witness, whom they had not had contact 
with for an extended period of time, had left the country.30  The 
prosecution asked for time to produce the witness but was not able to 
convince him to return to the United States to testify.31  The court 
denied the People’s request for additional time and Kalief was released 
on May 30, 2013 at 2:00 a.m. and given nothing but a metro card and 
the belongings he walked in with three years before as a 16-year old 
boy.32  
Although Kalief became a national advocate for prison reform, 
after his release from Riker’s, he struggled to overcome the trauma 
caused by solitary confinement and ultimately succumbed to the 
 
23 Id. 
24 Id.   
25 George Joseph & Simon Davis-Cohen, Internal Documents Reveal How Bronx 
Prosecutors are Taught to Slow Down Cases, APPEAL (Aug. 2, 2018), https://theappeal.org/int 
ernal-documents-reveal-how-bronx-prosecutors-are-taught-to-slow-down-cases/; 33 N.Y. 
JUR. 2D Crim. L.: Proc. § 1922, Duty of Prosecution to Communicate Readiness for trial to 
Court and Defense Counsel, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2019) (explaining that in order 
to comply with speedy trial requirements in New York—guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
and CPL (New York Criminal Procedure Law) § 30.30 (The Ready Rule)—a prosecutor has 
ninety days from arraignment to be ready for trial).  
26 THE KALIEF BROWDER STORY, supra note 4. 
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
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trauma he suffered while in prison.33  He received his GED after his 
release from Riker’s, then enrolled in Bronx Community College 
where he excelled for a few months until he suffered a mental break in 
November of 2013.34  He was brought to St. Barnabas Hospital in the 
Bronx, following an apparent suicide attempt.35  Kalief became 
increasingly more paranoid and believed some of his professors were 
undercover police officers.36  At home, he would sit in the dark and 
unplug the television because he thought it was “watching him.”37  On 
June 6, 2016, two years after his release, Kalief committed suicide in 
his home, by hanging himself from the window of his childhood 
bedroom.38 
The effects of solitary confinement are irreversible and 
detrimental to a person’s mental and physical wellbeing.39  It is a 
severe and harsh form of punishment that the United Nations has 
deemed to be inhumane and torturous.40  In a 2011 official press 
release, the United Nations called for a ban on solitary confinement 
except in very exceptional circumstances, and never for more than 
fifteen days.41  The UN report also called for the complete prohibition 
of the use of solitary confinement for juveniles, the mentally disabled, 
and those in pre-trial detention.42  The report cited to the long-lasting 
mental damage shown in scientific studies, which directly frustratesthe 
purposes of rehabilitation.43  To force juveniles into solitary 
confinement is undoubtedly cruel and unusual punishment.44  It also 
contradicts the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Roper v. 
Simmons45 and Graham v. Florida46 regarding the punishment of 
 
33 Id.  
34 Id.  




39 Juan Méndez, Solitary Confinement Should be Banned in Most Cases, UN Expert Says, 
UN NEWS (Oct. 18, 2011), https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/10/392012-solitary-confinement 
-should-be-banned-most-cases-un-expert-says. 
40 Id. 




45  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
46  See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
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juvenile offenders.47  The Court has long recognized that juveniles 
should be treated with a different standard of care than adults, and the 
primary focus of the incarceration of juveniles is rehabilitation so that 
they can learn from their mistake.48  Solitary confinement destroys the 
juvenile’s potential rehabilitation. 
Additionally, solitary confinement is being used egregiously 
for pre-trial detainees of all ages, despite not being convicted of the 
crime for which they are detained.  Inmates who are presumed innocent 
are often subjected to punishment based on largely uncorroborated 
allegations made by correctional officers.49  Subjecting pre-conviction 
detainees—people who are presumed to be innocent—to a punishment 
which causes irreparable harm is a clear violation of their liberty 
interests guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The 
liberty interests of juveniles are even further violated because, unlike 
inmates in the general population, they are unable to receive an 
education in solitary.  While most adults have graduated and received 
a basic education, juveniles are young and generally still attending 
school.  Furthermore, the deleterious impact on juveniles is 
significantly greater than it is on adults. 
This Note will focus on juvenile detainees and their pre-
conviction rights by examining three major factors that contributed to 
the unjust confinement of Kalief Browder.  It will address the effect of 
solitary confinement of juvenile offenders beyond the pre-conviction 
stage of legal proceedings.  This Note will argue that the use of solitary 
confinement for juvenile detainees who have not been convicted of a 
crime offends the basic principles of due process.  Additionally, it will 
argue that the use of solitary confinement for juveniles violates the 
Eighth Amendment.  The Supreme Court has held that juvenile 
offenders are subject to less severe punishments than adults because 
youths are not fully developed mentally, more impulsive, and therefore 
less culpable.50  Furthermore, the primary purpose of incarcerating 
juvenile offenders is for rehabilitation rather than deterrence or 
 
47 Id. (explaining that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of life without parole 
on juvenile offender who committed homicide); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 (prohibiting 
the death penalty for juvenile offenders). 
48 Graham, 560 U.S. at 71; Roper, 543 U.S. at 567. 
49 THE KALIEF BROWDER STORY, supra note 4. 
50 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 551. 
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incapacitation.51  The use of solitary confinement is psychologically 
destructive and defies the principles of rehabilitation.52 
This Note will further argue that allowing prison or jail 
personnel to serve as committee members for misconduct hearings also 
violates due process.  To permit the correction officers and prison 
officials to decide if an inmate should be placed in solitary is the 
equivalent of allowing the police who arrested the defendant to serve 
as jurors at his trial. 
This Note will be divided into five sections.  Section II will 
provide an historical overview of solitary confinement in the United 
States.  It will also examine New York’s new Raise the Age legislation 
and its probable effect on the use of solitary confinement within the 
state.  Section III will argue that the United States Supreme Court 
should declare the use of solitary confinement for juvenile offenders 
to be unconstitutional and will discuss the applicable constitutional and 
legal principles.  Section IV will analyze prosecutorial misconduct and 
abuse of the “ready rule” in state courts.  Finally, Section V will 
propose reform in both the state and federal prison systems regarding 
solitary confinement for juvenile offenders.   
II. SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
A. Historical Overview and Background 
Solitary confinement has been used as a form of punishment in 
the United States since the 1800s.53  It was originally intended as a 
form of rehabilitation, whereby prisoners were supposed to think about 
their crimes, read the Bible and repent.54  However, the harmful effects 
of solitary confinement became evident not long after its 
implementation.55  Only recently has the constitutionality of the 
 
51 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 71. 
52 Erica Goode, Solitary Confinement: Punished for Life, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/health/solitary-confinement-mental-illness.html; Ian 
M. Kysel, Banishing Solitary: Litigating an End to the Solitary Confinement of Children in 
Jails and Prisons, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 675, 707 (2016). 
53 Madeleine Stern, The Evolution of Solitary Confinement in The United States, LAW 
STREET MEDIA (July 2, 2014), https://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/health-science/evolution-
solitary-confinement-united-states/; Sandra Simkins, Juvenile Solitary Confinement, 296 N.J. 
LAW. 22 (2015).   
54 Stern, supra note 53. 
55 Id. 
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practice come into serious question.56  Most adult and juvenile 
correctional facilities, as well as the United Nations,57 define solitary 
confinement as confinement of 22-24 hours per day in isolation.58  
Prison cells are eight feet by ten feet on average and made of cement, 
with a hole in the metal door to slide meals through.59  Every effort is 
made to minimize human contact.60  Cells are often stripped bare and 
prisoners resort to habitual pacing around their cells to attempt to 
maintain their sanity.61  Solitary confinement has been proven to 
induce side effects such as visual and auditory hallucinations, 
hypersensitivity to noise and touch, insomnia, paranoia, uncontrollable 
feelings of rage and fear, distortions of time and perception, increased 
risk of suicide and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.62  Despite all of the 
proven adverse effects of solitary confinement, the use of this 
punishment on children in local jails and state prisons is remarkably 
high and difficult to track.63   
President Barack Obama announced a series of executive 
actions on restrictive housing in 2016, which banned the use of solitary 
confinement of juveniles in federal prisons and urged states to model 
the reforms implemented at the federal level.64  The President 
referenced Kalief Browder and emphasized the deep psychological 
impact this punishment has on young inmates, severely impairing their 
ability to become functioning members of society again.65  The United 
States is currently housing approximately 2.3 million inmates, with an 
estimated 80,000 of them being held in solitary confinement in state 
and local jails across the United States.66  Kalief’s death sparked 
 
56 Id.; Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (inviting 
Eighth Amendment challenges to the use of solitary confinement and emphasized its 
especially harmful impacts on juveniles and the mentally disabled). 
57 Supra note 53. 
58 Kysel, supra note 52. 




63 Kysel, supra note 52. 
64 Barack Obama, Why We Must Rethink Solitary Confinement, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barack-obama-why-we-must-rethink-solit 
ary-confinement/2016/01/25/29a361f2-c384-11e5-8965-0607e0e265ce_story.html?utm_ter 
m=.fbc53aba58fa; U.S DEP’T JUST., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE USE 
OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING (Jan. 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/815561/dow 
nload. 
65 Obama, supra note 64. 
66 Stern, supra note 53. 
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reform in New York for juvenile offenders, but the majority of states 
currently have no legislation in the area.67  Although there is a federal 
ban on solitary confinement for juveniles, the Supreme Court has not 
decided whether solitary confinement of juveniles who have not yet 
been convicted of a crime is constitutional, rendering state prisons and 
local jails virtually unregulated on its use.  However, the Court set 
some procedural standards for the use of solitary confinement for the 
prison population in general in Sandin v. Conner68 and Wolf v. 
McDonnell.69   
In Sandin v. Conner, the Court held that the Due Process 
Clause does not guarantee a prisoner the right to a misconduct hearing, 
or any other procedural protections prior to being placed in solitary 
confinement.70  However, the use of solitary confinement for pre-
conviction detainees is only permitted for administrative or 
disciplinary purposes.71  Administrators of state prisons and local jails 
have an unsettling amount of discretion over who is put in solitary and 
for how long.72  In some cases, inmates, especially those who have not 
been convicted of a crime, are provided a misconduct hearing prior to 
being placed in solitary confinement.73  However, these hearings are 
conducted inside the institution by employees of the facility.74  
Corrections officers can, and do, give inmates tickets arbitrarily which 
can lead to a loss of privileges and   “good time,”75 and often results in 
sending the inmate to solitary confinement.76  Because of the broad 
discretion of corrections officers and prison administrators, there is 
 
67 Anne Teigen, States That Limit Or Prohibit Juvenile Shacking and Solitary Confinement, 
NCSL (Aug. 16, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/states-that-
limit-or-prohibit-juvenile-shackling-and-solitary-confinement635572628.aspx. 
68 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 
69 418 U.S. 539 (1974).   
70 Conner, 515 U.S. at 487. 
71 Stern, supra note 53.  Administrative purposes refer to instances where the inmate is in 
danger of physical harm from other members of the general prison population and is placed in 
isolation for his own protection.  Disciplinary purposes refer to punishment implemented for 
misconduct and behavioral infractions while an inmate is incarcerated. 
72 Id. 
73 See Conner, 515 U.S. at 485, Wolf, 418 U.S. at 545-46. 
74 Conner, 515 U.S. at 475-76. 
75 Good Time Credit Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/ 
g/good-time-credit/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2019).  “Good Time” refers to the amount of time 
deducted from time to be served in prison on a given sentence, at some point after the 
prisoner’s admission to prison, contingent upon good behavior or awarded automatically by 
the application of a statute or regulation.  Id.  Good time can be forfeited for misbehavior.  Id. 
76 Stern, supra note 53. 
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virtually no oversight on the use of solitary confinement resulting in a 
dangerous abuse of discretion which can send an innocent person to 
solitary confinement for an indefinite amount of time based on the 
decision of one officer. 
Kalief was sent to solitary confinement for a ten month period 
for fighting with another inmate.77  Although Kalief was seen on video 
striking the first punch, approximately thirty inmates proceeded to 
attack him during the altercation.78  Based on the video, prison guards 
did very little to prevent the incident or protect Kalief.79  Immediately 
after the fight, Kalief was brought directly to solitary confinement 
without seeing a doctor or being provided any medical attention.80  
Prison authorities conducted no investigation into the reasons for the 
altercation or the identities of those involved.81  However, Kalief was 
a target of a gang in Riker’s because of his refusal to join.82  Because 
of his resistance to conforming to prison lifestyle, Kalief faced 
constant threats and abuse from inmates and guards, which could have 
ultimately led to the altercation.83 
B. Raise the Age Legislation 
New York State has taken steps to reform the criminal justice 
system’s harsh treatment of juveniles.  After the death of Kalief 
Browder and alleged prison misconduct at Riker’s, New York passed 
legislation that became effective on October 1, 2018, which raised the 
age of criminal liability for juvenile offenders.84  Prior to this 
legislation, juveniles aged sixteen and up were treated as adults and 
prosecuted in criminal court, regardless of the level of the offense of 
which they were accused.85  Now, most juveniles, except those charged 
with violent felony offenses, will have their cases heard in family 
court.86  The new legislation will prevent a significant number of 
 
77 THE KALIEF BROWDER STORY, supra note 4.   
78 Id. 
79 Id. 




84 New York Raises the Age of Adult Criminal Responsibility, N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY (Apr. 7, 
2017), http://nyassembly.gov/Press/20170407c/.  
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
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juveniles from ever entering the criminal justice system.87  As of 
October 2018, the following changes have taken effect: (1) all 
misdemeanor charges are now handled in family court, (2) all felony 
charges are initially handled in a new youth court part of the criminal 
court that will be presided over by a family court judge, (3) non-violent 
felony charges are subsequently transferred to family court, absent 
exigent circumstances presented by the district attorney, and (4) 
violent felony offenses remain in the youth part of the criminal court 
and are subject to a three part test weighing the severity of the crime 
to determine if the case is eligible for transfer to family court.88  
Juveniles whose cases are determined to be ineligible under the three 
part test are transferred to family court and treated as adults for 
sentencing purposes, which places them at risk of being sent to adult 
correctional facilities.89  All violent felony offenses are subject to this 
test to determine if the case should be heard in criminal or family court.  
Juveniles under seventeen years of age in New York’s county jails 
were ordered to be moved to youth facilities in October 2018.90  
Beginning in October 2019, all juveniles under eighteen years of age 
will also be moved to youth facilities.91  Juvenile offenders are now 
primarily held in youth facilities if convicted of a crime in New York.92  
Since state prisons in New York have banned solitary confinement for 
juveniles, they are only subject to solitary confinement if they are 
incarcerated in juvenile facilities, which remain dangerously 
unregulated because they are county facilities.93  Juveniles who are 
sentenced as adults in criminal court are sent to state adolescent 
offender facilities, subject to the supervision of the Office of Children 
and Family Services.94  The use of solitary confinement in these 
facilities is likely prohibited because they are regulated by the state, 
unlike juvenile detention centers run by the county.  However, because 
the use of these facilities is relatively new, it is unclear whether the 
Office of Children and Family Services is enforcing the prohibition of 




89 Id.  
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of solitary confinement in county facilities varies per county.  Kings 
County, for example, allows juveniles to be placed in solitary 
confinement if it is “necessary to prevent significant physical harm to 
the juvenile detained or to others when less restrictive alternatives 
would be ineffective.”95  This standard grants detention officers 
substantial deference, allowing for a predictable abuse of discretion.  
In a recent report by an independent monitor, the county was found to 
have illegally used solitary confinement for juveniles fifteen times 
between July and November of 2018.96   
The conditions of solitary confinement in juvenile detention 
centers are virtually the same as those in jails and prisons, and the 
centers have been the focus of an abundance of civil rights lawsuits on 
behalf of juvenile detainees across the country.97   
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The deleterious effects of isolation on prisoners have brought 
the constitutionality of solitary confinement under scrutiny in recent 
court decisions across the country.98  Cases such as Kalief Browder’s 
have generated a growing awareness of the torturous and inhumane 
conditions of solitary confinement in U.S. correctional institutions.  
The detrimental effects of solitary confinement are even greater for 
juveniles and contradicts the Court’s well-established principle of 
attempting to rehabilitate juvenile offenders.  The Supreme Court has 
noted in countless decisions that the basis for punishing juveniles 
should always be for rehabilitation rather than incapacitation.99  
Solitary confinement significantly diminishes the chances of 
rehabilitation into the community.100  The American Psychiatric 
Association, the American Public Health Association, the National 
Alliance on Mental Illness, the Society of Correctional Physicians, and 
 
95 Aaron Kunkler, Kings County is Still Using Solitary Confinement for Juveniles, Brothel-
Kenmore Reporter, BOTHELL-KENMORE REP. (Mar. 26, 2019), http://www.bothell-
reporter.com/news/king-county-is-still-using-solitary-confinement-on-juveniles/. 
96 Id. 
97 See Peoples v. Annucci, 180 F. Supp. 3d 294, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Davis v. Ayala, 135 
S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015). 
98 Annucci, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 299. 
99 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 
(2005). 
100 Lauren Kirchner, Why Solitary Confinement Hurts Juveniles More Than Adults, PAC. 
STANDARD (Oct. 9, 2014), https://psmag.com/news/solitary-confinement-hurts-juveniles-
adults-92054. 
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Mental Health America have all issued formal policy statements 
opposing solitary confinement due to the significant psychological 
harm inflicted.101  Inmates subject to solitary confinement are seven 
times more likely to harm themselves after being released from prison 
than those held in general population.102  The reasoning behind the 
Court’s decisions is especially true in the case of pre-conviction 
juveniles.   
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that no 
person shall be “deprive[d] . . . of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”103  Utilizing Kalief Browder’s case as an example to 
apply the principles of due process, it seems inherently wrong to allow 
a juvenile, who has not been convicted of a crime, to spend over seven 
hundred days in solitary confinement.  Kalief was denied his right to 
an education and deprived of three years of his childhood.  He was then 
put in torturous conditions and abused and ignored.  This was all done 
to a juvenile whose case was ultimately dismissed.  Kalief, like so 
many others, had no procedural protections in place to prevent this 
injustice from happening.   
A.   Due Process: Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
Solitary confinement used on pre-trial detainees contradicts the 
presumption of innocence that is guaranteed to every defendant 
accused of a crime.  Inmates who have not been convicted of a crime 
should not be subjected to the same punishments inside of jails as 
inmates who have been convicted.  Juveniles are particularly affected 
because they are deprived of any form of education while in solitary.104  
Although receiving an education is not a fundamental right guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal protection clause provides 
that all similarly situated individuals should be treated alike subject to 
varying standards of review.105  Although school age children are all 
guaranteed the same access to education, the Court applies rational 
basis to determine if the disparity of the treatment is supported by a 
 
101 Annucci, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 299. 
102 Id. 
103 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
104 Molly McCluskey, What if This Were Your Kid?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 24, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/juvenile-solitary-confinement/548933/. 
105 Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2006); Michael Salerno, Reading is 
Fundamental: Why No Child Left Behind Act Necessitates Recognition of a Fundamental 
Right to Education, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 509 (2007). 
12
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legitimate state interest.106  Juvenile offenders placed in solitary 
confinement experience gaps in their education which leave them 
unprepared or even unable to return to school after being released.107  
Between 2015 and 2016 over eighty juveniles were held in solitary on 
a regular basis at the Onondaga County Justice Center located in 
Syracuse, New York.108  They were isolated for twenty-three hours per 
day and given an optional high school equivalency packet to complete 
without any educational instruction or guidance.109  Because 
correctional institutions have absolute discretion in placing an inmate 
in solitary confinement, many of these juveniles were sent to solitary 
due to minor disciplinary infractions.  The impact and long-term 
detrimental effects caused by solitary confinement are so severe that 
the decision to punish a juvenile in such a manner calls for judicial 
intervention. 
1. Pre-trial Detainees 
In A.J ex rel. L.B. v. Kierst, the Eighth Circuit held that “the 
due process standard applied to juvenile pretrial detainees should be 
more liberally construed than that applied to adult detainees.”110  The 
plaintiffs in Kierst filed a class action against the Jackson County 
Juvenile Justice Center alleging civil rights violations, due to 
conditions of solitary confinement they were exposed to while 
incarcerated.111  The court noted that the appropriate test to apply to 
determine the constitutionality of solitary confinement for pre-trial 
detainees would be under the Fourteenth Amendment as opposed to 
the Eighth Amendment.112  Furthermore, when a juvenile is being held 
in a juvenile detention center, rather than an adult facility, the 
appropriate standard of measurement would be to use the Fourteenth 
Amendment and not the Eighth Amendment because the conditions 
 
106 Sanchez, 454 F.3d at 33. 
107 McCluskey, supra note 105.  
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 A.J. ex rel. L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1995). 
111 Id. at 856.  Plaintiffs complained of prison overcrowding, being forced to sleep on floor 
mattresses due to lack of available beds and various issues which led to an unfair trial.  
112 Id. at 854.  The Eighth Amendment protects inmates from cruel and unusual punishment, 
whereas the Fourteenth Amendment provides juveniles who have not been convicted of a 
crime a due process interest in freedom of unnecessary bodily restraint. 
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leading to confinement may be drastically different.113  Some juveniles 
are held in youth facilities due to a “runaway status” or from 
delinquency petitions that are not criminally based.114  In both 
instances, the inmate has not been convicted of a crime; therefore, 
placing him in solitary confinement infringes an individual’s liberty 
interest guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment..115  “[J]uveniles . . . , who have not been convicted of 
crimes, have a due process interest in freedom from unnecessary 
bodily restraint which entitles them to closer scrutiny of their 
conditions of confinement than that accorded convicted criminals.”116  
In Santana v. Collazo, the court weighed the legitimacy of the state’s 
interest in implementing solitary confinement on juveniles against the 
deleterious impacts that it has on them.117  The court held that if the 
state can show a legitimate reason for placing juveniles in solitary, then 
solitary confinement will withstand constitutional scrutiny.  However, 
“the possibility that some juveniles . . . have been and will continue to 
be subjected to unpleasant and perhaps physically and psychologically 
damaging restrictions on their liberty that are not reasonably related to 
legitimate government interests in imposing those restrictions” is 
troubling.118  The court in Collazo applied a rational basis standard in 
analyzing the constitutionality of solitary confinement on juvenile 
offenders and acknowledged that solitary is a disciplinary measure 
which results in a substantial curtailment of an individual’s freedom.119  
However, the court failed to directly address whether solitary 
confinement of juveniles substantiates a legitimate interest or if it 
serves as an additional form of punishment.120  
In R.G. v. Koller, the plaintiffs, three LGTB juveniles, were 
subjected to solitary confinement due to their sexual orientation.121  
Each of the plaintiffs endured physical and verbal abuse from guards 
while incarcerated at Hawaii Youth Correctional Facility (“HYCF”).122  
Many of the inmates housed at HYCF were placed there for non-
 
113 Id.  
114 Id.  
115 Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983). 
116 Id. at 1182. 
117 Id.  
118 Id.  
119 Id. at 1181. 
120 See id. at 1172. 
121 R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Haw. 2006). 
122 Id. at 1140. 
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criminal offenses, such as skipping school or running away from 
home.123  Juveniles are often held in detention centers for non-criminal 
offenses but are nevertheless subject to solitary confinement.124  
Inmates who are not charged with or convicted of a criminal offense 
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth 
Amendment. 125  The court held that holding the inmates in isolation in 
an alleged attempt to protect them from other inmates was not an 
acceptable professional practice and violated their due process 
rights.126  The court in Koller based its holding on several prior rulings 
which concluded that, except in extreme circumstances, the use of 
solitary confinement for juveniles is a violation of the Due Process 
Clause.127   
2. Misconduct Hearings 
Although the Supreme Court held in Wolf v. McDonnell that 
prisoners may claim the protections of the Due Process Clause, it also 
said that those rights are subject to restriction due to the nature of 
prison environments.128  Those restrictions also include the right to an 
attorney, the right to cross examine one’s accusers, and the right to 
present one’s own defense at prison misconduct hearings.129  Because 
the defendant is subject to “the most serious deprivations” in a criminal 
trial, the Court reasoned that prisoners should not receive the same 
procedural due process rights as free citizens, even if they have not yet 
been convicted of a crime.130  Additionally, the Court said that the 
potential for havoc inside a prison is increased by the ability to cross 
examine accusers,131 and emphasized the importance of prison 
institutions having discretion over their own disciplinary measures.132  
The Court was concerned about dangerous conditions inside prisons 
 
123 Id. at 1154. 
124 Id. at 1155. 
125 Id. at 1154. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. at 1154-55. 
128 Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567 (1974). 
129 Id. 
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 568.  If a prisoner were allowed the ability to cross examine his accuser, he would 
be made aware of who made accusations against him leading to a disciplinary infraction, which 
in prison is likely to incite a physical altercation and make the informer a target among 
inmates.   
132 Id. 
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that could be exacerbated by “constitutional impediments.”133  
However, as discussed in the dissenting opinion, the Court implied that 
the Constitution requires that people, including prisoners, be afforded 
the right to present their own defense at misconduct hearings by calling 
witnesses and providing evidence.134  Although the Court advised 
prison officials to grant prisoners such rights, it declined to hold that 
they are required to do so.135  Several years later, the Court, in Bell v. 
Wolfish, narrowed this decision and held that placing an inmate in 
solitary confinement infringes on the inmate’s due process rights if 
done with an express intent to punish and without a legitimate 
institutional interest.136  Therefore, correctional officers can simply 
claim that a prisoner was placed in isolation for a legitimate purpose 
without any procedural safeguards preventing them from abusing this 
discretion.137   
In Sandin v. Conner, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the 
Due Process Clause does not necessarily afford a prisoner the right to 
a misconduct hearing or any other procedural protections prior to being 
placed in solitary confinement.138  The appellant in Conner was placed 
in solitary based on allegations of misconduct.139  Although he was 
placed in isolation, fully bound in leg restraints and waist chains, and 
only allowed fifty minutes per day out of his cell to exercise and 
shower, the Court held that that the conditions of his confinement were 
not substantially different from those of the general prison 
population.140  However, as Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, 
the majority of prisoners who were not placed in solitary were given 
eight hours per day outside of their cells, interacted with other inmates 
and were able to work or take classes.141  Although the majority based 
its decision in part on the assertion that solitary confinement did not 
pose an atypical hardship on the prisoner in this case, the dissent 
argued that the majority’s reasoning actually led to the opposite 
 
133 Id.  
134 Id. at 581 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
135 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
136 Id.; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
137  Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 581 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
prison officials have absolute discretion when placing an inmate in solitary confinement and 
that judicial intervention is not required).  
138 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S 472, 487 (1995).   
139 Id. at 494 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
140 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
141 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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conclusion, and that the prisoner had a liberty interest protected by the 
Due Process Clause.142  In determining if an inmate has been deprived 
of a procedurally protected liberty, the Court has relied on the nature 
and severity of the deprivation.143 
Conner was held in solitary for thirty days after he was 
convicted of a crime, for which he received a sentence of thirty 
years.144  Kalief had been placed in solitary for over seven hundred 
days, had not been convicted of a crime, and his case was ultimately 
dismissed.145  The severity of the deprivation of Kalief’s liberty interest 
far outweighed that of Conner’s.  The Court’s decision in Conner relied 
on the conclusion that the inmate did not suffer an atypical hardship as 
a consequence of his time in solitary.  The conditions and 
circumstances of Kalief’s time in solitary are distinguishable from 
Conner’s, rendering the holding inapplicable to Kalief’s case.  The 
Court reasoned that placing the inmate in solitary confinement without 
a misconduct hearing in Conner did not deprive him of any due process 
rights because the conditions of the inmate’s confinement did not 
present an atypical hardship for him based upon the duration of time 
spent in solitary and the conditions of his confinement in comparison 
to the rest of the prison population in that facility.   
Misconduct hearings are inherently unfair because they are 
held by correctional officers and employees of the same institution 
accusing the inmate of misconduct.  Therefore, whether the inmate 
spends thirty or seven hundred days in solitary confinement, the 
correctional institution is imposing a severe punishment without any 
fair proceedings and is given too much discretion which often results 
in arbitrarily placing inmates in solitary.  The Court in Sandin v. 
Conner emphasized the importance of allowing prisons to impose 
punishments free from too much government interference or 
guidelines due to the nature of the dangerous and chaotic 
environment.146  However, the Court’s decision jeopardizes the liberty 
interests of pre-trial detainees because it grants too much deference to 
prison officials, allowing inmates who are presumably innocent to be 
placed in solitary confinement without judicial review.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment prevents states from depriving any person of “life, liberty, 
 
142 Id. at 487. 
143 Id. at 493 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
144 Id. at 475. 
145 THE KALIEF BROWDER STORY, supra note 4. 
146 Conner, 515 U.S. at 480. 
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or property, without due process of law.”147  Since prison misconduct 
hearings are unduly biased and because implementing court 
proceedings prior to placing an inmate in solitary would not be 
efficient or feasible, the only reasonable solution should be to ban the 
use of solitary confinement for juveniles in its entirety. 
Although the defendant in Sandin v. Conner was not a juvenile, 
the same procedural guidelines apply for all prisoners.148  Correctional 
facilities ultimately have full discretion over their own disciplinary 
hearings and can place inmates in solitary for administrative and 
disciplinary reasons, without any intervention by courts or 
legislatures.149 
B. Eighth Amendment Concerns 
Juvenile offenders are not usually held to the same standards of 
accountability as adults and, therefore, are not typically subject to the 
same severe punishments.  Punishments such as life without parole and 
the death penalty are unconstitutional when imposed on juveniles, in 
part because neither gives juveniles any chance of rehabilitation in 
their lifetime.150  Prison officials ignore basic principles that the Court 
has mapped out when implementing punishment.  The unique harms 
caused to juveniles, along with the distinct legal differences between 
adults and juveniles, call for a higher standard in conditions of 
confinement because the ability to rehabilitate is significantly 
diminished due to the irreversible damage resulting from solitary 
confinement. 
1.  Roper and Graham 
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that it is 
unconstitutional to sentence juveniles to death, reasoning that juveniles 
lack self-control, and are vulnerable and susceptible to their 
surroundings.151  Punishments for juveniles should therefore not be as 
severe as they are for adults because “signature qualities of youth are 
transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness 
 
147 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
148 See Conner, 515 U.S. at 472. 
149 Id. 
150 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
151 Id. at 570. 
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that may dominate in younger years may subside.”152  In Graham v. 
Florida, the Court further asserted its view on the treatment of juvenile 
offenders in the criminal justice system, declaring it unconstitutional 
to sentence a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole.153  The 
Court’s decision in this case relied on the principles of rehabilitation 
as a basis of punishment as opposed to deterrence, incapacitation or 
retribution, when dealing with juvenile offenders.154  Additionally, the 
Court stated that “[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth 
Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ 
youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.”155  The application 
of these principles in the context of the detrimental impacts of solitary 
confinement on youths calls the constitutionality of this practice into 
question.  Although the Court has not yet decided whether a juvenile 
should be subject to solitary confinement, prior decisions relating to 
the punishment and sentencing of juveniles have protected them156 
from the harsher and more permanent punishments which are imposed 
on adults.  “Traditionally, juvenile detainees are afforded greater 
constitutional protection” than adult detainees.157  The Court prohibits 
life without parole and the death penalty for juveniles because both of 
these forms of punishment contradict the underlying purpose to 
rehabilitate juvenile offenders.  Similarly, due to the irreparable harm 
to juveniles caused by solitary confinement, the chance of 
rehabilitation is significantly diminished.158 
2.   Eighth Amendment Cases 
The literature on the deleterious effects of solitary confinement 
is “virtually unanimous in its conclusion: prolonged supermax solitary 
confinement can and does lead to significant psychological harm.”159  
To assess the constitutionality of solitary confinement under the Eighth 
Amendment the Court looks at factors such as the length of time that 
the inmate spends in isolation and the likelihood of mental 
 
152 Id. 
153 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 76. 
156 Id.; see Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
157 A.J. ex rel. L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1995). 
158 Peoples v. Annucci, 180 F. Supp. 3d 294, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
159 See, e.g, McCluskey, supra note 105; Kirchner, supra note 101; U.S DEP’T JUST., 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 64. 
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deterioration.160  The Court has been reluctant to hold that solitary 
confinement for adult inmates is unconstitutional; however, “[i]t 
would not be unreasonable to assume that society’s conscience might 
be shocked by the conditions of confinement imposed on a juvenile in 
an isolation cell, when it would be unwilling to label the same 
treatment, given to an adult, cruel and unusual.”161  In Turner v. 
Palmer, the plaintiff, a sixteen year old girl, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 for violations arising out of her incarceration at an Iowa 
juvenile detention center.162  The teenage girl was placed in a small 
cement cell in complete isolation for weeks at a time, with only a small 
thin mat to sleep on.163  She was held in solitary confinement for 289 
out of the 528 days she was incarcerated, and prohibited from 
classroom instructions, homework, reading material or any outside 
communication.164  During this period, the plaintiff repeatedly cried 
and banged her head against the wall.165  The court denied defendant’s 
motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity and held that the 
plaintiff sufficiently alleged Eighth Amendment violations due to the 
conditions and extent of the plaintiff’s confinement.166  The court based 
its reasoning on the decision in A.T. ex rel. Tilman v. Harder.167  In 
Harder, the plaintiffs, two juvenile males, filed suit seeking injunctive 
relief due to conditions of solitary confinement at Broome County 
Correctional Facility in New York.168  Plaintiffs were held in 8-foot by 
10-foot cells for approximately 23 hours per day and deprived of 
education and related support services.169  Correctional officers 
admitted to placing juveniles in solitary confinement at their own 
discretion for infractions such as not standing for count and throwing 
water in the cafeteria.170  The plaintiffs cited to numerous cases where 
the courts have determined the confinement of adults to be 
 
160 Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983). 
161 Id. at 1179. 
162 Turner v. Palmer, 84 F. Supp. 3d 880, 881 (2015) (Plaintiff was a juvenile delinquent 
and deemed a child in need of assistance at age 16 and was thereby ordered to be placed in the 
Iowa Juvenile Home.). 
163 Palmer, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 881. 
164 Id.   
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 A.T. ex rel. Tilman v. Harder, 298 F. Supp. 3d 391, 398 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding 
juvenile offenders are afforded more liberal due process protections than adults). 
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unconstitutional and persuasively argued that juveniles are far more 
vulnerable than adults to the potential long-term effects of solitary 
confinement.171  The court granted injunctive relief based on a showing 
of Eighth Amendment violations.172   
In Peoples v. Annucci, prisoners filed a class action against the 
New York State Department of Corrections and Community 
Supervision for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
challenging solitary confinement practices across the New York State 
prison system.173  Although the suit encompassed inmates of all ages, 
the settlement was groundbreaking and highlighted the disturbing 
abuse of discretion displayed by prison officials when determining if 
an inmate should be placed in solitary confinement and the length of 
the isolation.  Peoples was sentenced to two years in solitary 
confinement for maintaining legal documents in his cell  deemed to be 
contraband by correctional officers.174  Counsel representing Peoples 
joined complaints of additional inmates, Richardson and Fenton, and 
an historic settlement was reached on behalf of thousands of 
prisoners.175  Similar to Peoples, Richardson was also sent to solitary 
for three years over documents that he had in his cell.176  Fenton was 
placed in solitary for two years for reporting a sexual assault which 
was deemed to be unsubstantiated by correctional officers, for helping 
another inmate buy sneakers and for sending a sample of food to the 
court claiming it had been tampered with.177  The court found the 
settlement agreement to be fair and reasonable but also encouraged 
further reform which was not addressed in the settlement negotiations, 
such as enhanced mental diagnosis and treatment, improved food 
quality, warmer clothes and cells and reforms to protect inmates from 




173 Peoples v. Annucci, 180 F. Supp. 3d 294, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
174 Id. 
175 Id.  
176 Id. 
177 Id.  
178 Id. at 307. 
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While solitary confinement can be destructive to an adult, it can 
shatter a juvenile.179  Its impact on juveniles is irreparable.180  The 
practice is cruel and inhumane and often leads to neurological and 
psychological damage due to the torturous conditions inmates are 
forced to endure.181  Juveniles who spend prolonged periods of time in 
solitary are more likely to commit suicide as a result.182  Kalief 
Browder’s case emphasizes the devastating consequences resulting 
from this senseless punishment.183 
IV. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND THE STOP THE CLOCK 
GAME 
It would be hard to imagine how any person could be in jail for 
three years without ever going to trial.  However, this is a common 
problem that stems from prosecutorial misconduct.184  In New York, a 
prosecutor has ninety days from arraignment to be ready for trial.185  
However, prosecutors can say that they are not ready at arraignment 
and request a one-week adjournment, but may not be given another 
court date for two months due to court congestion.186  In those seven 
weeks in excess of what the prosecutors asked for, the clock stops 
running, which results in the defendant’s having only one week 
accounted for in speedy trial considerations.  When the next court date 
comes, the prosecutors may do the same thing and keep pushing the 
clock.187  After they exhaust several not ready delays, they start asking 
for adjournments that do not count against them such as the 
unavailability of a witness or a conflict with another case on the same 
 
179 Brittney A. Puckett, Solitary Confinement of Juveniles and Our Evolving Standards of 
Decency: A Look at Recent Action Taken by the Court, Congress, the President and the States, 
38 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 63, 65 (2016). 




184 Joseph & Davis-Cohen, supra note 25; 33 N.Y. JUR. 2D Crim. L.: Proc., supra note 25, 
§ 1922. 
185 Joseph & Davis-Cohen, supra note 25; 33 N.Y. JUR. 2D Crim. L.: Proc., supra note 25, 
§ 1922. 
186 Joseph & Davis-Cohen, supra note 25; 33 N.Y. JUR. 2D Crim. L.: Proc., supra note 25, 
§ 1922. 
187 Joseph & Davis-Cohen, supra note 25; 33 N.Y. JUR. 2D Crim. L.: Proc., supra note 25, 
§ 1922. 
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day.188  Prosecutors are trained and encouraged to delay court 
proceedings as long as possible to put pressure on the defendant to take 
a guilty plea.189  Kalief appeared in court over thirty times while 
incarcerated.190  He was offered deals but refused to take a plea bargain 
and adamantly maintained his innocence.191  Kalief was repeatedly sent 
to solitary confinement while awaiting the day that the People would 
eventually announce they were ready for trial.  However, this day never 
came because the People were never ready for Kalief’s case, and the 
People had no hope to be ready for trial in the future.  The complaining 
witness left the country at an unknown time and was not in contact 
with the prosecution.  The People did not have a victim or witness to 
produce and could not in reality go forward with trial.  The judge 
finally dismissed the charges against Kalief after the prosecution 
revealed that they could not contact the complaining witness; however, 
the harm that Kalief suffered from his extensive time in solitary 
confinement was irreparable at that point.  His time on solitary 
confinement caused him irreparable harm, ultimately leading to his 
death.  Such prosecutorial misconduct alone is unjust, particularly 
when a juvenile is subjected to the inhumane conditions of solitary 
confinement before trial.  
VI. PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSION 
Although New York has made tremendous improvement in 
decreasing the use of solitary confinement of juveniles in correctional 
institutions, substantial reform is still desperately needed.  The federal 
government, along with several states, has banned the use of solitary 
confinement for juvenile detainees.192  New York should follow the 
federal model and ban the use of solitary confinement for juvenile 
offenders within the state.  Juvenile detention centers are not 
prohibited from imposing solitary confinement on juveniles because 
they are typically county facilities, not subject to the regulations of 
 
188 Joseph & Davis-Cohen, supra note 25; 33 N.Y. JUR. 2D Crim. L.: Proc., supra note 25, 
§ 1922. 
189 Joseph & Davis-Cohen, supra note 25; 33 N.Y. JUR. 2D Crim. L.: Proc., supra note 25, 
§ 1922. 
190 THE KALIEF BROWDER STORY, supra note 4.   
191 Id.   
192 Anne Teigen, States That Limit Or Prohibit Juvenile Shacking and Solitary 
Confinement, NCSL (Aug. 16, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice 
/states-that-limit-or-prohibit-juvenile-shackling-and-solitary-confinement635572628.aspx. 
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state prisons.  Although New York’s Raise the Age legislation should 
serve as a model for other states to follow in their prosecution of 
juvenile offenders, its use of solitary confinement is an archaic 
punishment that goes against the rehabilitative effects that confinement 
is supposed to enhance.   
Moreover, in Davis v. Ayala, Justice Kennedy invited Eighth 
Amendment challenges to the use of solitary confinement for juvenile 
offenders, indicating that the Court may finally be willing to make a 
determination on the issue.193  Intervention from the Supreme Court is 
desperately needed to prohibit the use of solitary confinement in all 
states.  Despite the lack of litigation in the area, there seems to be a 
general consensus that solitary confinement causes irreparable harm to 
inmates, especially juveniles.  In his concurring opinion in Ayala, 
Justice Kennedy called for litigators to challenge the constitutionality 
of holding all persons in solitary confinement in U.S. prisons and 
specifically referenced the tragic death of Kalief Browder.194  
Correctional facilities use biased disciplinary hearings to decide if a 
prisoner should be placed in solitary confinement without due process 
of law.  The use of solitary confinement infringes upon pre-conviction 
detainees’ due process rights, and the long-term effects are irreparable.  
Therefore, the use of solitary confinement for juvenile offenders—
especially those who have not been convicted—should be prohibited 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. 
 
 
193 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015). 
194 Id.  
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